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The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) provides that foreign states shall
be immune from the jurisdiction of U.S.
courts unless the suit falls within a
specified statutory exception to immunity.
There is currently a conflict among the
federal circuit courts over whether suits
against individual foreign officials are
covered by the FSIA. If such suits are not covered by the FSIA, additional
questions are raised concerning a possible common law immunity for
foreign officials. This Insight describes both the conflict and the additional
questions.
Background
The FSIA does not define “foreign state” directly, but rather provides that
for the purposes of the Act a “foreign state” “includes a political
subdivision” as well as an “agency or instrumentality.”[1] The phrase
agency or instrumentality is in turn defined to include “any entity” that “is
a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise” and that is either an
organ of a foreign state or has a majority of its shares or other ownership
interests owned by a foreign state.[2]
The FSIA does not specifically include individual foreign officials in its
definition of a foreign state. Nor is there any indication in the legislative
history of the Act that it was intended to confer immunity on individuals.
Nevertheless, in a 1990 decision, Chuidian v. Philippine National Bank,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that suits against
foreign officials for actions taken in their official capacity are covered by
the FSIA.[3] In that case, a Philippine citizen sued a member of a
Philippine governmental commission after the official instructed a bank
not to honor a letter of credit that had been issued by issued by the
former Marcos government. In holding that the defendant was entitled to
sovereign immunity from the suit, the court reasoned that the terms
“agency,” “instrumentality,” “organ,” “entity,” and “legal person,” “while
perhaps more readily connoting an organization or collective, do not in
their typical legal usage necessarily exclude individuals.”[4] The court
also reasoned that, if individual foreign officials lacked immunity, litigants
could “accomplish indirectly what the [FSIA] barred them from doing
directly” by simply naming the responsible official rather than the foreign
state as the defendant.[5]
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In Chuidian, the Executive Branch filed an amicus curiae brief arguing
that individual foreign officials were not covered by the FSIA, but that the
FSIA should be interpreted as leaving intact the common law immunity
that such officials would have possessed prior to the FSIA’s
enactment.[6] While the Ninth Circuit recognized that the Executive
Branch’s proposed approach might reduce the danger that the FSIA’s
conferral of immunity would be circumvented through pleading against
responsible officials rather than the state, the court nevertheless rejected
it as inconsistent with what it understood to be the purposes of the FSIA.
One such purpose, the court explained, was to shift immunity
determinations away from the Executive Branch to the courts, whereas
the court assumed that, if the pre-FSIA immunity regime were to be
applied to suits against individual foreign officials, “presumably we would
once again be required to give conclusive weight to the State
Department’s determination of whether an individual’s activities fall within
the traditional exceptions to sovereign immunity.”[7] The court also
thought that allowing a common law immunity regime to exist alongside
the FSIA’s immunity regime would be inconsistent with Congress’s effort
in the FSIA to regulate sovereign immunity comprehensively. [8]
Until recently, all  the circuit courts to have addressed the issue had
agreed with the Ninth Circuit that suits against individual foreign officials
for actions taken in their official capacity are covered by the FSIA,
although many of these courts did so without much independent
analysis.[9] The first circuit court to suggest a contrary view was the
Seventh Circuit in a 2005 decision, Enahoro v. Abubakar.[10] In that
case, a group of Nigerian citizens was suing a former member of a
military junta that had ruled Nigeria, alleging that he was responsible for
acts of torture and murder in Nigeria. In concluding that the defendant
was not covered by the FSIA, the court stated that it was “troubled” by
the reasoning in Chuidian, and it expressed the view that “[i]f Congress
meant to include individuals acting in the official capacity in the scope of
the FSIA, it would have done so in clear and unmistakable terms.”[11]
Conflict in the Circuits
In a decision issued in January 2009, Yousuf v. Samantar, the Fourth
Circuit squarely disagreed with Chuidian.[12] In Yousuf, a group of
Somali citizens brought suit under the Alien Tort Statute and the Torture
Victim Protection Act against a former high-ranking Somali official,
alleging that he was responsible for acts of torture and other human
rights violations committed against them in Somalia. The district court
concluded that the defendant was entitled to immunity under the FSIA
and proceeded to dismiss the action because none of the FSIA’s
exceptions to immunity was satisfied. In reversing this decision, the
Fourth Circuit reasoned that the phrase “separate legal person” in the
FSIA’s definition of agency or instrumentality “suggests that corporations
or other business entities, but not natural persons, may qualify as
agencies or instrumentalities.”[13] The court also pointed out that the
definition of agency or instrumentality goes on to require that the entity
be neither a citizen for purposes of certain diversity of citizenship
provisions that are inapplicable to individuals, nor “created under the
laws of any third country,” a phrase that would not make sense as
applied to individuals.[14] In addition, the court observed that the
service of process provisions of the FSIA do not appear to contemplate
service on individual defendants.[15] Finally, the court noted that the
FSIA’s legislative history gives no indication that the phrase “separate
legal person” applies to natural persons.[16] The court did not address
whether the defendant in that case was entitled to common law immunity
and instead remanded to the district court on that and other issues.
As it argued in Chuidian, the Executive Branch has continued to
maintain that suits against individual foreign officials do not fall within the
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FSIA, but that such officials should receive the benefit of common law
immunity.[17] Such common law immunity, the Executive Branch has
argued, extends to all acts “performed on the state’s behalf, such that
they are attributable to the state itself,” and it has further argued that this
immunity is not subject to the exceptions set forth in the FSIA.[18] In
addition, the Executive Branch has contended that, although it “need not
appear in each case in order to assert the immunity of a foreign official, .
. . where it does so appear, its determination is conclusive.”[19] Like the
Fourth Circuit in Yousuf, the Executive Branch has also criticized the
textual analysis by the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian.
An Alternate Approach: Treating the State as the Real
Party in Interest
It may turn out that there is a better textual basis for applying the FSIA to
suits against individual officials than the “agency or instrumentality”
language relied upon by the Ninth Circuit in Chuidian. As noted above,
the term “foreign state” is not directly defined in the FSIA. It could be
argued that, when an individual foreign official is sued for conduct carried
out in an official capacity, the suit is actually one against the state rather
than against the individual, given that states can only act through
individuals. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has noted in the context of
suits against officials of U.S. states, “official-capacity suits generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent.”[20] Under this approach, a foreign official
might not need to fall within the definition of “agency or instrumentality.”
Rather, an official-capacity suit could simply be characterized as one
against the foreign state itself, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s effort to
plead against the individual. Somewhat analogously, under a statute
known as the Westfall Act, suits against federal employees are treated as
suits against the United States if the Attorney General certifies that “the
defendant employee was acting within the scope of his office or
employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose.”[21]
In addition to avoiding some of the textual problems associated with
Chuidian’s “agency or instrumentality” approach, this “foreign state”
approach might also address some of the policy concerns that have
been raised by the Executive Branch. The Executive Branch has been
concerned that, under the Chuidian approach, individual officials will be
denied immunity whenever the case falls within one of the FSIA’s
statutory exceptions to immunity, potentially exposing individual officials
to broad personal liability for a foreign state’s commercial activities.[22]
Under the “foreign state” approach, however, the foreign officials would
not be subjected to any personal liability for acts carried out in an official
capacity, since the suit would be treated as one against the state, not
against the officials. The Executive Branch also has expressed concern
that, under the Chuidian approach, suits against foreign officials will be
subject to the FSIA’s more lenient rules concerning attachment of assets
and punitive damages that apply when a suit is brought against an
agency or instrumentality rather than the foreign state itself.[23] Under
the “foreign state” approach, however, foreign officials acting in an official
capacity would not themselves be considered agencies or
instrumentalities, so the more lenient rules would apply to their acts only
if the entity they worked for otherwise fell within the definition of “agency
or instrumentality.”
Common Law Immunity
Despite these considerations, even the “foreign state” approach might
need to leave some room for common law immunity for officials who are
no longer in office. The Supreme Court has held that the determination of
whether an entity qualifies as an “instrumentality” of a foreign state
should be based on the facts that exist at the time the lawsuit is brought
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rather than at the time of the conduct in question.[24] If that temporal
standard were applied to suits against individual officials (despite the
potentially greater foreign relations sensitivities in such suits), it might
mean that only officials in office at the time the suit is filed would be able
to invoke the protections of the FSIA. Indeed, in Yousuf, the Fourth
Circuit invoked this proposition as an alternative justification for its
reversal of the district court, since the defendant in that case was no
longer in office.[25] According to the Executive Branch, however, even
former officials should be protected by common law immunity for their
official acts taken while in office.[26]
Finally, it should be noted that some courts have already concluded that
one aspect of immunity relating to foreign officials is governed by a
common law approach rather than the FSIA – the immunity of foreign
heads of state (such as presidents, prime ministers, monarchs, and
ministers for foreign affairs).[27] Unlike other government officials,
heads of state may be entitled under international law to absolute
immunity from the jurisdiction of foreign courts, without regard to the
distinction between official and personal capacity, at least while they are
in office.[28] In applying head of state immunity, U.S. courts tend to
give substantial deference to the views of the Executive Branch, just as
courts did with respect to foreign sovereign immunity more generally
prior to the enactment of the FSIA.[29]
About the Author
Curtis Bradley, an ASIL member and previous chair of the international
law in domestic courts interest group, is the Richard A. Horvitz Professor
of Law and Professor of Public Policy Studies at Duke Law School, and
is also the Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs. His courses
include International Law, Foreign Relations Law, and Federal Courts.
Endnotes
[1] 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
[2] 28 U.S.C. § 1603(b).
[3] 912 F.2d 1095 (9th Cir. 1990).
[4] Id. at 1101.
[5] Id. at 1102.
[6] See id. at 1101.
[7] Id. at 1102.
[8] Id. at 1102-03.
[9] See, e.g., Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 (6th
Cir. 2002); Byrd v. Corporacion Forestal y Industrial de Olancho S.A.,
182 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1999); El-Fadl v. Central Bank of Jordan, 75
F.3d 668, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
[10] See 408 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2005).
[11] Id. at 881-82.
[12] 552 F.3d 371 (4th Cir. 2009).
[13] Id. at 380.
[14] Id.
The American Society of International Law
http://www.asil.org/insights090317.cfm[9/24/2012 11:37:18 AM]
Contact Us © 2012 The American Society of International Law • 2223 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington DC 20008 • Phone 202-939-6000 
   Association Software Powered by AMO - Coldfusion Programming by Minneapolis Web Design Firm ArcStone
[15] Id. at 380-81.
[16] Id. at 381.
[17] See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Affirmance, Matar v. Dichter, No. 07-2579-cv (Dec. 19, 2007), at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/Matar%20v%20%20Dichter,%
20US%20for%20Defendants%20Amicus%20Brief%2012.19.07.pdf
.
[18] Id. at 21.
[19] Id. at 3.
[20] Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978).
[21] 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d). For a recent decision with reasoning along
these lines, albeit one that ultimately follows the Chuidian approach, see
In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 84 (2d Cir.
2008).
[22] See Brief for the United States (cited in note 17), at 15.
[23] See id. at 16-17.
[24] See Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 480 (2003).
[25] 552 F.3d at 381-83.
[26] See Brief for the United States (cited in note 17), at 17-18.
[27] See, e.g., Ye v. Zemin, 383 F.3d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 2004); United
States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1212 (11th Cir. 1997); Lafontant v.
Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 131-37 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
[28] See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of
the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ Rep. 3 (Feb. 14) (holding that a minister
for foreign affairs was entitled to absolute immunity from foreign criminal
jurisdiction).
[29] See, e.g., Zemin, 383 F.3d at 625-27.
